

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

24 March 1977

NOTE FOR

25X1

Fritz:

Here are three paragraphs you requested from me for your PRM-11 outline. They are pretty bare-bones but can be expanded if necessary.

Please let me know if you need more.



25X1

SA-D/DCI/IC

Attachments:
As stated

INFORMATION

III-A-3. Spokesman on operations

The DCI's role as spokesman on intelligence operations within his responsibility as the President's foreign intelligence advisor is exercised primarily through the mechanism of the Special Coordination Committee (SCC). The SCC is the successor to the Operations Advisory Group (OAG) and the earlier 40 Committee, both of which were similar in purpose to the SCC. The SCC is charged, inter alia, to deal with ~~such matters as~~ the oversight of sensitive intelligence activities, such as covert action, which are undertaken on Presidential authority. The SCC routinely reviews all peripheral reconnaissance operations, overhead reconnaissance operations, and other sensitive, covert or clandestine intelligence operations which require NSC-level attention. The DCI is the sponsor or senior intelligence spokesman for all intelligence operations reviewed by the SCC. However, except for special and limited situations, the staff support for the DCI in SCC matters is provided by CIA, and the recommended positions are almost wholly representative of CIA interests. Thus, the DCI position in support of specific peripheral reconnaissance operations is based entirely on the value to CIA of the data to be collected. Occasionally CIA provides to the DCI comments on perceived political risks entailed in reconnaissance operations, but normally the SCC looks to State Department, Defense and JCS representatives

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for risk assessments. Operational feasibility and the value of collected intelligence from military reconnaissance operations are also addressed by DoD representatives. Normally, the DCI is the operational spokesman only on CIA-proposed operations.

It seems appropriate to consider recognition of a broader DCI role in all intelligence operations reviewed by the SCC wherein the DCI would be the primary spokesman on intelligence value in satisfaction of requirements and the principal evaluator of risk versus gain on all reconnaissance, sensitive, covert and clandestine intelligence collection operations.

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V-A. The DCI role as protector of sources and methods

Protection of sources and methods is one of the few DCI responsibilities having a statutory basis. Despite the assignment in law, however, the DCI has been provided with no means of implementation or enforcement other than such rules and procedures as he may devise and promulgate. The greatest single shortcoming of this situation is the complete lack of criminal or civil sanctions which can be applied to persons who violate the procedures set forth by the DCI. Until this problem can be rectified by further statutory enactment, there is little or nothing additional that the DCI can do to enforce his current responsibility for sources and methods protection.

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V-B. The DCI role as guarantor of propriety

The DCI has no unique responsibility or authority to be the guarantor of propriety for the Intelligence Community. As an appointed public official, he is sworn to uphold the Constitution and to execute all duties of his office in a responsible manner. As the head of the CIA, he is of course provided with an Inspector General and the normal mechanisms for discovery and investigation of improprieties within the CIA structure. However, there is no existing or recognized structure or procedure whereby he can extend such authority beyond CIA into the other elements of the Intelligence Community. His personal integrity and his authoritative influence over other elements of the Community represent the strongest means available to guarantee propriety outside the CIA. Executive Order 11905 created the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) for the purpose of discovering and reporting on improprieties throughout the Community, but the DCI has no responsibility to the IOB other than to ensure cooperation and compliance by the CIA. The absence of any sort of Community Inspector General and the stipulation that Inspectors General of all Intelligence Community organizations should report discovered or suspected improprieties directly to the IOB effectively removes from the DCI any specific or directed role concerning improprieties throughout the Community.

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